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Introduction
Many Latin American nations have recently implemented liberal trade regimes, often as part
of a larger set of market-oriented reforms, and have abandoned their industrialisation policies based
on import-substitution. In the 1980s, Chile, Mexico and Bolivia where among the continent's first
nations to slash tariff rates and virtually eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports. They were
followed little later by many others, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago. All these countries are now much more exposed to
international competition than ever before.
In the context of this new openness to trade, discussions about the international
"harmonisation" of a minimum set of labour standards have moved to the forefront of the Latin
American policy agenda. There is indeed a growing feeling among many government officials that
the continent's high unemployment partly results from "unfair" trade practices abroad. In particular,
it is alleged that many East Asian nations deliberately restrict labour rights in order to gain a special
competitive advantage, stimulate exports and attract inflows of foreign direct investment. This is
why governments in Argentina, Chile or Uruguay have decided to provide some support for a
"social clause" in the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
1. But is this a good idea? Are labour rights
really more restricted in export-oriented Asian nations than they are in Latin America? And if yes,
are Latin American workers prejudiced by Asia's lower standards? These are the main questions
addressed in this paper.
The paper has two objectives. The first, in section 1, is to present a brief description of core
international labour standards promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), as well as
to provide an overview of the ratification and -when possible- the enforcement of these standards in
Asia and Latin America. As pointed out by the OECD Secretariat (OECD, 1996, p.48), it is
"difficult to make an overall assessment of the degree of enforcement of core labour standards
across countries. Information on this issue is sparse and incomplete. The lack of reliable indicators
on enforcement is especially acute regarding child labour, forced labour and non-discrimination in
employment". Nevertheless, the evidence that is available confirms the intuition that in general the
                                                       
1 Such a clause would make it legal for any country to restrict the importation of goods produced by foreign workers
whose basic labour rights are not respected.- 2 -
implementation of labour rights is weaker in Asia -and especially in East Asia- than in Latin
America.
The second objective of the paper, in Section 2, is to discuss -and provide some evidence-
on possible linkages between labour standards, international trade, and foreign investment. In
particular, the paper defends the view that -in theory- there are three plausible ways for weak Asian
labour rights to hurt Latin American employment. The first is by increasing Latin American low
skilled labour-intensive manufacturing imports from Asia; the second is by making Latin American
manufacturing exports less competitive; and the third is by diverting foreign investment away from
Latin America. The question of the magnitude of these effects, however, is an empirical matter. And
this is why the paper also offers a quick overview of the available -but contradictory and
ambiguous- evidence. Finally, policy implications are discussed.- 3 -
Labour standards and working conditions in Asia and Latin America & Caribbean:
a comparative perspective
1.1 Ratification and enforcement of ILO Conventions
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) was created in 1919 by the treaty of
Versailles. Its aim is to promote world peace through social justice by encouraging as many
countries as possible to ratify and enforce international labour standards. These standards - which
are designed to establish a minimum level of labour conditions across countries- are codified in 181
"Conventions" that create international legal obligations and which, together, form the so-called
"international labour code"
2. Most Conventions are accompanied by one or more non-binding
"Recommendations".
In principle, once international labour standards are ratified they become part of individual
countries' set of domestic labour rules and laws that are generally written into labour codes or
industrial relations acts (Plant, 1994; OECD, 1996). It is thus only insofar as ILO Conventions find
a way into countries' national law books that they become part of the normative framework which
effectively regulates working conditions and industrial relations. It is important to remember this
basic observation because what ultimately determines the economic effects of labour standards is
not the ratification of treaties but the implementation of the principles that they embody. This link
between the ratification of ILO Conventions and the improvement in labour conditions can be
broken in at least two ways: first, labour standards may be quickly adopted but poorly enforced, so
that workers in many countries may face bad labour conditions even though the country has ratified
many ILO Conventions. This is a widespread problem, especially since there is no mechanism that
allows the ILO to take any sanctions. Second, it is possible that workers in a country with few ILO
ratifications, like for example the U.S. (which has ratified only 15 out of the 181 Conventions),
enjoy decent labour conditions anyway, either because the country has good  domestic labour
regulations or simply because the country is in an advanced stage of economic development.
                                                       
2 International labour standards are classified by the ILO itself into no less than 14 categories: basic human rights,
employment policy, social policy, human resources development, social security, labour administration, labour
relations, conditions of work, employment of women, employment of children and young persons, older workers,
migrant workers, indigenous and tribal people, workers in non-metropolitan territories, and particular occupational
sectors- 4 -
1.2 Core international standards and human rights
Recent studies on the globalisation of the world economy have discussed whether free trade
should be conditional upon the harmonisation of a certain number of labour standards (see, for
example, Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996 or OECD, 1996). Such studies have generally emphasised the
distinction between core and non-core labour standards, reflecting the growing consensus that what
should be discussed at the multilateral level, if anything, is the harmonisation of the former type of
standards (Langille, 1997; Maskus, 1997). According to the OECD (1996) and to the Declaration
of the World Social Summit in Copenhagen, 1995, the minimum set of core -or fundamental- labour
rights includes the following principles:
1) the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining
2) the prohibition of exploitative forms of child labour
3) the prohibition of forced labour
4) the prohibition of discrimination in employment and remuneration
All these rights relate, although sometimes imperfectly, to seven fundamental ILO
Conventions (see table 1) which, in turn, overlap with principles of Human Rights expressed in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CPR) and in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR), both adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1966
3. It is often argued that -since human rights are universal- such core labour standards should
be enforced throughout the world independently of political, economic, social or cultural factors. It
is also sometimes assumed that the respect for these core standards will "pave the way" for the
establishment of better working conditions and wages (OECD, 1996).
     
Table 1: core ILO Conventions
                                                       
3 Article 6 of the ESCR indicates that work must be freely chosen; article 7 prohibits discrimination in employment
and remuneration, and also recognises to everyone the right to enjoy conditions of work that are just, safe and healthy,
with reasonable working hours and periodic holidays; article 8 guarantees the right to form and join trade unions, and
to exercise the right to strike in conformity with national laws; article 10 states that children should be protected from
economic and social exploitation, and that countries should adopt minimum working age laws.- 5 -
Principle Main Conventions Number of Ratifications
(by 01.06.1998)
1) Freedom of Association and Protection of the
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Figure 1 (below) shows that Latin American & Caribbean countries have -on average-
ratified a much higher proportion of all of the 7 core ILO Conventions than Asian countries. Asian
countries (excluding Japan and Central Asia) have on average ratified only 3 out of the 7 core ILO
Conventions (44%), compared to an average of 6 out of 7 for Latin American & Caribbean
countries (86%). A more detailed picture of the Asian ratification pattern (shown in figure 2)
indicates that the East Asian region
4 -which comprises most of the continent's export-oriented
nations- has a very low scorecard (36%), while South Asia
5 performs slightly better (60%). Finally,
as illustrated in figure 3, the significant difference between the two continents also appears in the
ratification rate of noncore ILO standards. Latin American & Caribbean countries have basically
ratified about 3 times as many ILO Conventions as Asian countries: 52.5 per nation instead of 17.8.
The first impression we thus get is that Latin American & Caribbean nations seem to care more
about core labour standards than Asian countries. However, as pointed out above, this impression
could be misleading. In principle ILO Conventions could be poorly implemented in Venezuela or in
the Dominican Republic -which have both ratified 100% of core Conventions-  and labour
conditions in Korea and China -which have ratified only one Convention- may be better as its low
ratification rate suggests. More detailed evidence is therefore offered in the follwing sub-sections.
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Korean Republic, Lao, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.






























































































Core standards in Asia and Latin America & the Caribbean
Source: ILO (1998)
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Figure 3- 7 -











Source: ILO (1998)  
1.3 Collective bargaining
Conventions 87 and 98 respectively establish the principles of freedom of association, and
of the right to organise and to bargain collectively. Convention 87 guarantees the right for all
workers and employers -except members of the armed forces and the police- "to establish and join
organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation" (Article 1). It prohibits "public
authorities" from interfering with the right of these organisations "to draw up their own constitutions
and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities
and to formulate their programmes" (Article 2). Even though not directly mentioned, the right to
strike has been considered as implicitly covered by this Convention. Convention 98 refers to the
horizontal relationship between workers and employers. It stipulates that "workers shall enjoy
adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination" by employers, like for example the
dismissal of union members or any other interference. The two Conventions are thus
complementary. 
Figure 4 shows the striking ratification pattern for these two ILO Conventions. We observe
that 82% of all Latin America & Caribbean countries have ratified both of them, and that 91% of
those countries have ratified at least one of the two. This compares very favourably with Asia,
where only 26.3% of nations have ratified both Conventions and 58% have ratified one.- 8 -
Figure 4
Ratification rate of ILO standards on freedom of 













At least 1 Convention
Source: ILO (1998) 
As illustrated in figure 5, these differences are not just on paper! They quite strongly reflect
the reality of industrial relations in the two regions (even though they somewhat distort the picture in
a favourable way for Latin American countries). According to information by the OECD (1996), it
is possible to establish more or less independent unions or workers' organisations in 61% of all
Latin American & Caribbean countries but only in 21% of Asian countries. This finding confirms
the World Bank's view according to which, in East Asia, there is "an active government role in
repressing labour organisations" and "although complete bans have been rare, governments have
employed extensive definitions of essential industries or services in which organising is banned
(often including export processing zones), instituted onerous provisions for union registration,
provided weak (or no) protection for union organisers and, in some cases, have been guilty of the
most serious human rights abuses against independent labour leaders" (1995c, p.26).
As for Latin America, -where, it has to be pointed out, the situation is still far from perfect-
the association between the ratification of ILO Conventions and the practice of industrial relations
has clearly improved over time. In many countries, the right to establish free unions is a by-product
of the recent democratisation process of the political system and of Constitutional changes that
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Before these changes, Latin American States typically displayed a
high degree of protection for the individual worker, but repressive attitudes towards unions -
perceived as communist or anarchist threats (see Bronstein, 1995).- 9 -
Figure 5














The objective of Convention 138 is to eliminate child labour. It requires signatory parties to
set a minimum age for employment that is no lower than the age for completing compulsory
schooling. As a general rule, this minimum age should be no lower than 15 -or 14 in developing
countries. But for "light work" the age can be lowered to respectively 13 and 12. On the other hand,
for hazardous work likely to jeopardise the "health, safety or morals" of young persons the
minimum age is generally 18. Convention 138 allows some exceptions for activities which raise
special practical problems of application like family undertaking. Note that there is currently no
international consensus on whether this ILO Convention really embodies a fundamental labour right.
In particular, it is pointed out that the Convention does not distinguish between "exploitative" and
"non-exploitative" forms of child labour. This is why the ILO has drafted in 1998 a new Convention
focusing on the elimination of "intolerable forms" of child labour. The definitive version of this new
Convention should be opened to ratification in 1999, after approval by the 87th International
Labour Conference.
Regional differences in the ratification of Convention 138 on child labour are very
spectacular. As shown in figure 6, about 50% of Latin American & Caribbean countries have
ratified Convention 138 compared with only 11% of Asian countries. However, according to the
ILO (1996), national laws in both regions tend to be quite similar. Indeed, even though only few- 10 -
Asian countries have ratified Convention 138 -often judged too complex and difficult to implement
in detail- many governments have adopted restrictions on child labour at the national level. But how
well are these laws enforced?
According to the ILO's latest data, there are throughout the world 250 million children
between 5 and 14 years old who work -half of which do so full-time. Out of these 250 million, 152.5
million work in Asia and 17.5 million in Latin America. This means that that 61% of the world's
working children are found in Asia, compared to 7% in Latin America & the Caribbean (figure 7).
This difference in absolute numbers is massive. It reflects to a large extent demographic factors:
there are about 10 times more children in Asia than in Latin America. And when comparing child
labour incidence -the share of child workers as a proportion of a country's total number of children-
the difference is somewhat less compelling. Indeed, child labour incidence is only about 30% higher
in Asia than in Latin America: 21.1% instead of 16.5%.
Figure 6
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Conventions 29 and 105 are about the elimination of all forms of forced labour. Convention
29 prohibits labour "exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty, and for which the
said person has not offered himself voluntarily" (Article 2), and it stipulates an obligation for State
authorities to punish any improper behaviour. The Convention also prohibits prison labour when
prisoners are "hired" or "placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations".
There is nothing wrong, however, with minor community work, military service, or with prison
labour that is carried out "under the supervision and control of a public authority". Convention 105
is about the suppression of politically motivated forced labour, as found in many former Latin
American military regimes or socialist countries ("gulags"). It prohibits forced work "as a means of
political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views"; "as a
method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development"; "as a means of
labour discipline"; "as a punishment for having participated in strikes"; and "as a means of racial,
social, national or religious discrimination" (Article 1).
Figure 8 shows that in Latin America & the Caribbean 91% of countries have ratified both
these Conventions related to the prohibition of forced labour and all countries have ratified at least
one of them, compared to only respectively 31.5% and 73% of Asian countries. There is no
systematic evidence on the scale of forced labour in the two regions. Anecdotal evidence suggests
however that child slavery is more widespread in Asia than in Latin America & the Caribbean.
Based on the cases reported to the ILO "Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions- 12 -
and Recommendations", the ILO itself considers that "child slavery (...) has long been reported from
South and South-East Asia and West Africa, and despite vigorous official denial of its existence it is
both common and well-documented" (ILO, 1996, p.15).
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Convention 100 and Convention 111 are about the elimination of discrimination in wages
and employment. Conventions 100 is very simple and clear. It stipulates an obligation for member
countries to ensure that men and women who perform work of equal value receive equal
remuneration (Article 2). Convention 111 goes one step further and requires members to "promote"
equal occupational and employment opportunities for all individuals, whatever "race, colour, sex,
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin" (Article 1).
Here again, 91% of Latin American & Caribbean countries have ratified both Conventions
and all nations have ratified at least one, compared respectively to 37% and 68% of Asian countries.
There is no evidence to confirm that -in practice- discriminations are more frequent in Asian than in
Latin American labour markets. According to UNDP (1995) estimates, average wages of women
relative to men seem to be relatively similar in both regions. However, women's participation in
industry is almost twice as high in Asia (37% of all hours worked) as it is in Latin America (20% of
all hours worked), indicating that any possible systematic gender-based discrimination might occur
on a larger scale in Asia  (UNDP, 1995).- 13 -
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Source: ILO (1998)- 14 -
Does Asia's weak  enforcement of core standards hurt
Latin American & Caribbean employment?
2.1 The controversy about the links between trade and labour standards
The tentative evidence presented above indicates that -as a rough generalisation-
fundamental labour rights are better guaranteed in Latin American & the Caribbean than in Asian
countries. This is unfortunate for the many Asian men, women and children who suffer from the
denial of these rights. Is it also -albeit for different reasons- unfortunate for Latin American &
Caribbean workers? Does East Asia's weak enforcement of labour rights -given the growing
integration of the world economy- hurt working men and women in Kingston, La Paz or Mexico
City? The answer to this question depends on whether -and how- labour standards interact with
international trade and with foreign investment flows.
Economic research in this area is still rather scarce and controversial. The first major study
on the subject was undertaken by the OECD Secretariat in June 1994 and published two years later
(OECD, 1996). Its main finding is that core labour standards have a positive effect on economic
efficiency and development, but that they have no effect whatsoever on international trade or foreign
investment. All developing countries are thus invited to respect workers' basic human rights, and
Latin American countries are -implicitly- summoned not to care about Asian labour standards and
to keep the "social clause" issue out of the WTO. A similar recommendation emerges from a World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper (Maskus, 1997).
Such conclusions, however, fly in the face of an old intuition according to which labour
standards -and especially the right to collective bargaining (with all its implications)- have at least
some effect on international trade. The ILO Constitution states that "...the failure of any nation to
adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to
improve the conditions in their own countries" (quoted in Sengenberger, 1994). Similarly, the 1947
Havana Charter of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) -which was intended to replace the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) but was never ratified by the U.S. Congress-
declared that "unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in
international trade" (quoted in Rodrik, 1995).- 15 -
Even though resource endowment and technology are clearly the most important
determinants of trade, it is widely recognised that government policies can modify comparative
advantage (see, for example, Markusen et al., 1995). Thus, as pointed out by the OECD itself, it is
far from unreasonable to assume that the denial of core standards can be used to "prolong or
strengthen an existing comparative advantage, and, in some instances, create a new one" (OECD,
1996, p.97). The following sections defend the view that there are three plausible ways for low
Asian standards to hurt employment mainly for low skilled workers in Latin America & the
Caribbean. The first is by increasing Latin American imports from Asia; the second is by making
Latin American manufacturing  exports less competitive in third markets; and the third is by
diverting foreign investment away from Latin America.
2.2 Latin American imports from East Asia
Because of rich endowment in land and natural resources, Latin America's comparative
advantage is in processed and unprocessed primary goods, while East Asia's advantage is in basic
manufactures. This is at least the impression one gets when looking at trade data for the two
regions. It is indeed a fact of life that Latin American exports tend to include a higher share of
processed and unprocessed primary goods relative to manufactures than East Asian exports (Wood
and Berge, 1997). How, then, would one expect restrictions on labour rights in Asia to affect
bilateral trade between the two regions? The answer is simple. Insofar as such restriction reduce
labour costs -and thus production costs- they will lead to an increase in Latin American imports of
the now cheaper basic manufactures from Asia (Rodrik, 1995). And as a result, some mainly low
skilled Latin American workers will lose their jobs. On the other hand, however, we would also
expect a corresponding increase in Latin American exports of processed and unprocessed primary
goods towards Asia -and the creation of new employment opportunities in that sector. Overall, low
East Asian standards can thus be seen as just another source of trade creation.
Between 1980 and 1994, Latin American imports from East Asia have indeed been
multiplied by 8, so that nowadays nearly 10% of all Latin American imports come from East Asia
compared with 3.1% in 1980 (UNCTAD, 1996). The main reason for this increase is certainly a
reduction in trade barriers among the two regions. But part of this trade expansion may also be due
to Asia's low standards. Few trade economists dispute this possibility. What they argue, however, is
that such an increase in bilateral trade -whether due to differences in the enforcement of labour- 16 -
rights or anything else- is beneficial for Latin America (see for example Krugman, 1997 or Rodrik,
1995). Traditional gains from trade arise irrespective of the source of trade. Latin America gets an
extra opportunity to allocate its resources more efficiently and consumers enjoy a higher purchasing
power; they can buy cheap Asian goods instead of more expensive domestic substitutes. But what
about employment?
To be sure to reap the gains from trade, countries must fulfil a certain number of conditions
which are rarely met in Latin America. In particular, there must be a flexible labour market that is
ready to re-absorb workers displaced from import-competing sectors, for example in the expanding
primary processing industry. Unfortunately, both the notorious rigidity of the Latin American
labour market, and the fact that primary processing is less labour-intensive than basic
manufacturing (Owens and Wood, 1997) make such a happy end unlikely. The growing bilateral
trade -partly due to Asia's low standards- may thus very well increase unemployment in Latin
America
6. And, if such is the case, the traditional gains from trade must be balanced against the
losses associated with the non-utilisati on of a part of the country's human resources.
3.3 Latin American exports to third markets
North-South manufacturing trade models generally consider that the North has a
comparative advantage in technology and skill-intensive products, while the South has an advantage
in low skilled labour-intensive goods (see for example Wood, 1994). In such a framework both East
Asia and Latin America are generally considered as part of the South. Indeed, apart from land and
natural resources, the two regions have similar factor endowments: most workers have only a basic
level of education but a fairly-well developed infrastructure (Wood, 1997a). Thus,  within the
manufacturing sector both regions tend to specialize in the same kind of low skilled labour-intensive
products (textiles, clothing, footwear, electronics, etc...). In Argentina and Colombia, for example,
these products of medium and low skill intensity account for about 80% of manufacturing exports
(Londero and Teitel, 1996). The implication is that -as globalization proceeds- one would expect
both region to expand their exports of labour-intensive manufactures to the North -providing many
new job opportunities for the low skilled in the formal sector and reducing unemployment.
                                                       
6 According to Krugman (1997), this is a second-best argument in the sense that it would be more efficient for Latin
American countries to remove the source of their labour market rigidity than to reduce trade with East Asia.- 17 -
In 1990, however, Latin American countries exported only 11.6% of all manufacturing
exports by developing countries, compared to 82.7% by Asian countries (Page, 1994). This means
that, in export markets, Latin American firms have been "outperformed" by Asian companies. There
are certainly many reasons for this. But it is conceivable that the weaker enforcement of labour
rights in East Asia is one of them. Indeed, by allowing Asian companies to enjoy  "artificially" low
production costs, it is possible that low standards -just like a currency devaluation- have induced
third countries to import more of their labour-intensive manufactures from Asia rather than Latin
America. This is very unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, because it reduces Latin America's
real income and makes it hard for the continent to follow the World Bank's advice to diversify its
exports away from natural resources into basic manufactures (World Bank, 1995a). Second,
because it reduces demand for Latin American low skilled workers, and thus -given the continent's
already mentionned labour market rigidity- increases unemployment and the size of the urban
informal sector.
It is essential, at this stage, to notice that the suppression of labour rights in a group of
developing countries increases the competitiveness of that group's exports only at the expense of
nations with a similar export structure. Indeed, exported goods must be substitutable. This means
that OECD firms -which tend to specialise in a more technology and skill-intensive brand of
manufactures- are not affected by Asian labour standards in the same way than Latin American
countries are. The only way weak Asian labour rights affect OECD countries is by reducing the
price of its imports, improving its terms of trade. This points to the fact that the South-South
dimension of the international trade and labour standards issue is even more thorny than the North-
South dimension of the question.
2.4 Foreign direct investment, the race to the bottom, and export processing zones
Since the end of the 1980s, FDI flows to developing countries have increased impressively.
According to the World Bank (1996), developing countries’ share of global FDI has risen from 12%
in 1990 to 38% in 1995. This is because new technologies and cheaper transports have led to the
spread of vertical integration in manufacturing; affiliates of multinational companies are no more
only replicas of the parent companies, producing for the local market, but are increasingly becoming
a specialised part of the multinationals' production chain. In other words, OECD firms are shifting
their low skilled labour-intensive activities -especially assembly work- to poor countries where- 18 -
labour costs are low. Such a "delocalisation" of part of the production process is designed to reduce
costs and keep multinationals competitive in world markets. A well-known example is the assembly-
based investment of U.S. companies in Mexican maquiladoras. Most of vertical integration is
concentrated in traditional manufactures like textiles, garments and electronics. But, more recently,
delocalisation has also gained importance in high-tech electronics industries, like semiconductors.
Such mobile -or "footloose"- industries can be readily competed for by many developing
countries and the slightest advantage can be determinant in attracting them. In recent years, most of
the dramatic increase in the flow of foreign direct investment to developing countries has been
directed towards Asian and not Latin American countries. Asia's share of such flows has moved up
from form 15.3% in 1980 to 56.4% in 1994, while Latin American countries' share has fallen
during the same time from 71.9% to less than 25% (De Mello, 1997). Here again, there are certainly
many reasons for this trend. But one of these may be that multinationals tend to set up affiliates in
countries where labour standards -and therefore production costs- are lower, increasing the rate of
returns to investment. In other words, the absence of labour rights may divert foreign investment -
and employment creation for low skilled workers- away from Latin America. As a result these
nations will also enjoy less of the benefits generally associated with foreign investment, among
which technology transfers, improvement of workers' skills and management techniques, increased
demand for domestic inputs, and higher tax revenues (Maskus, 1997).
Note that it is often feared that that international competition for capital could trigger a
"race to the bottom" among developing countries, which is a situation where nations compete for
foreign investment by restricting labour rights. It is true that any country which has a pre-existing
tendency to attract little capital might have an incentive to lower its labour standards (Krugman,
1997). International harmonisation of labour standards would be useful to make sure that such an
outcome is avoided. Especially since the simple  fear by governments that high standards may
discourage foreign investment may lead to the decision to restrict labour rights (Wilson, 1994).
    This is especially true in Export Processing Zones (EPZ), which now exist all over the
developing world. Such special zones are clearly major actors in the intra-South competition for
foreign investment. In 1990, about 50% of multinational companies' total employment in developing
countries were located in EPZs, providing typically between 60% and 80% of jobs within such
regions (OECD, 1996). In EPZs, restrictions of collective bargaining rights are frequent and most of- 19 -
the work is performed by non-unionised women (Maskus, 1997 and OECD, 1996). Moreover, when
labour laws are not restricted governments often fail to enforce them properly. This however seems
to be as true in Latin America and Caribbean countries as it is in Asia. However, the overall impact
of such practices may be of more consequence in Asia -where 64% of world-wide EPZ employment
is located (OECD, 1996) and where EPZs account for much of the manufacturing export growth.
2.5 Empirical evidence
The above sections have explained how in principle Latin America may suffer from low
East Asian labour standards. But in the end, the extent to which international differences in labour
standards affect the competitive position of nations is an empirical issue, on which much more
research is certainly needed to reach a consensus. This section presents a quick overview of the
main -generally contradictory- evidence available so far.
l Does the implementation of labour standards increase unit labour costs
7? This is a
critical question for if standards do not affect labour costs -and thus production costs- there is no
reason why they should have any effect on trade or foreign investment. Available evidence is
ambiguous. Rodrik (1995), using cross-country analysis with data on labour costs for 40 countries
(and controlling for productivity), finds that labour costs tend to increase significantly as standards
become more stringent. Rama (1995) also uncovers a positive -though small- association between a
country's number of ILO ratifications and the annual growth rate of labour costs in the
manufacturing sector. As for Seguino (1997), she contends that in Korea the average female wage is
typically about half the average male wage. Assuming that 20% of this wage difference reflects
gender-based discrimination -as seems to be the case in the U.S. (see Filer et al., 1996)- it is
possible to infer as a very rough approximation that gender-discrimination reduces employers'
labour costs by about 10%. This may have an important impact on production costs, especially
when considering that in Korea all the largest export-oriented industries are female dominated: they
form 72.9% of all apparel employees, 62.5% of all textiles employees, and 52.6% of electronics
employees (Seguino, 1997)!
The OECD (1996), on the other hand, finds no correlation at all between freedom of
association and labour costs. This last result is, however, rather surprising. It is indeed well
established that -within countries- unionised workers receive higher wages than non-unionised
                                                       
7 "unit labour costs" are labour costs per unit of production- 20 -
workers, and that as a result of collective bargaining average unit labour costs in low skilled labour-
intensive activities typically increase by about 5%-15% (Filer et al., 1996). Such activities are
precisely the ones that account for most of developing countries' exports. As for child labour, the
ILO (1996) contends that in it generates a labour cost savings (as a share of the product's final
price) of about 5% for bangles and 5% to 10% for carpets.
l Do labour standards affect trade patterns and export performance? An increase in unit
labour costs should in principle translate into an increase in the price of a country's goods on
international markets -unless there is a corresponding currency depreciation. Thus, if labour
standards affect labour costs, they should also affect trade flows. But here again evidence is
contradictory. The OECD (1996) finds that no clear relationship exists between labour standards
and sectoral trade patterns or export performance (i.e. the share of manufacturing exports in world
trade). Indeed, consistently with its findings that standards have no effect on labour costs, the
OECD finds that prices of U.S. textile imports from developing countries are rather uniform. This,
so the OECD, suggests that differences in the degree of freedom of association plays little role in the
determination of export prices and thus export performance. According to the Secretariat of the
Paris-based institution, most of the low to medium-income countries have exhibited export
dynamism irrespective of their level of core labour standards. It recognises that some countries
where freedom of association has recently been strengthened (Argentina, Korea, and Taipei) have
suffered a loss in export competitiveness, but reckons that this was mainly due to labour shortages
and currency appreciation -both of which pushed up manufacturing labour costs in the 1980s. Other
studies contradict the OECD's view.
Mah (1997), for example, shows that the ratification of ILO core Conventions -apart from
the Conventions on forced labour- worsens developing countries' export performance (as proxied by
the value of exports/GDP). In such countries, he finds that it is especially the ratification of the
Conventions on freedom of association and non-discrimination that  strongly deteriorates export
competitiveness. By contrast, the negative effect of ILO Conventions on exports is not found in
developed countries. Presumably this is because they are specialised in skill and technology-
intensive products -in which the share of labour cost in production cost is much lower than in
labour-intensive sectors and in which competition is based on product differentiation rather than on
pure price competitiveness. Similarly, Rodrik (1995) finds that -even though not very strong- his
empirical results are supportive of the hypothesis that low standards can help create a comparative- 21 -
advantage in labour-intensive goods such as textiles and clothing. In accordance with Mah's results,
he finds that this is mainly true for countries with a GDP/capita smaller than 6,000 U.S dollars.
  l Do labour standards affect the location of foreign investment? Here evidence is made of
2 pieces. First, there is some evidence that labour costs determine the location of multinationals
within the developing world. Indeed, empirical research confirms the intuition that labour costs are a
statistically significant determinant of foreign investment -especially in labour-intensive and export-
oriented industries (for a quick summary of the literature on the determinants of foreign investment
to low-income countries see ODI, 1997). This is confirmed in two recent studies by Brainard and
Riker (1997a and 1997b). They find that within multinationals labour demand in each affiliate is
related to the cost and demand conditions of other affiliates owned by the same firm. For example a
10% fall in Mexican labour costs typically leads U.S. multinationals to reduce their Malaysian
workforce by 1.6%. In the electronics industry, in particular, a 10% decline in wages in one
developing country leads to an 3.7% employment increase in the affiliate located in that country,
and a 6.3% fall in employment in affiliates located in other developing countries. These results
suggest that it is indeed the case that workers in developing countries compete with each other to
perform labour-intensive work, and that standards -insofar as they affect labour costs- have the
power to shift employment from one developing country to another.
Second, some (few) studies have tried to assess directly the effect of labour standards on
foreign investment flows. Here the evidence is not only very scarce but also once again ambiguous.
The OECD (1996) finds that empirical evidence on the links between FDI and core labour standards
"remains open to different interpretations" and concludes that "while core labour standards may not
be systematically absent from investment decisions of OECD investors in favour of non-OECD
destinations, aggregate FDI data suggests that core labour standards are not primary factors in the
majority of investment decisions of OECD companies (...). In these circumstances, host countries
may be able to enforce core labour standards without risking negative repercussions on FDI flows"
(pp.123-124). The problem, unfortunately, is that the OECD study fails to distinguish between two
types of foreign investment: local-market oriented investment within OECD countries (which still
represents the majority of FDI flows), and cost-saving North-South investment (discussed above).
Rodrik (1996), when restricting the sample to developing countries, finds a weak but positive
relationship between low labour standards and inflows of foreign investment and concludes that
labour standards do affect foreign investment (p.21). Here again, much more research is certainly
needed to settle the debate.- 22 -
2.6 A "social clause" in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ?
For the sake of the argument, let's assume three things: a) low Asian labour standards do
have an effect on trade and foreign investment flows; b) this is bad for Latin American nations
because it increases unemployment among low skilled workers. How, then, could Latin American
countries convince East-Asia's export-oriented nations to ratify and enforce more of the ILO's core
Conventions? The first option, as always, is to apply diplomatic pressure and use the force of
persuasion. A second option -which would need to be carefully assessed and whose evaluation is
outside the scope of this paper- is to provide (or continue to provide) support for the introduction of
a "social clause" in the World Trade Organisation.
Such a "social clause" would make it possible to restrict imports of goods produced abroad
under conditions that violate the principles embodied in core ILO standards. As pointed out by
Maskus (1997), there are three main routes for introducing labour standards in the WTO. The first
is an expansion of Article XX which states a few general exemptions to the basic rule of non-
discrimination. Article XX(e), in particular, permits WTO members to unilaterally ban imports
made by prison labour. It would in principle be easy to extend this possibility to goods made by
bonded children, discriminated women, or by workers who are unable to bargain collectively. A
second route would be to extend the interpretation of Article VI so as to treat the lack of respect for
basic labour rights in export sectors or in EPZs as a form of "export subsidisation" or "social
dumping" to which countries could respond in the same way as they respond to other forms of
"dumping": through countervailing duties (Rodrik, 1995; Charnovitz, 1992). Finally, the third route
would be to negotiate a separate multilateral agreement that would make it compulsory for WTO
members to enforce basic labour rights. In case the agreement is violated any WTO member could
invoke Article XXIII and call for the suspension of trade benefits.
Of course, the introduction of a social clause in the WTO is very controversial, and many
counter-arguments have been advanced. The first problem with a "social clause" is its possibly
discriminatory use. Indeed, the threat of trade restrictions is very much an instrument of power
politics in international relations. And as such, a "social clause" -if opened to unilateral action- can
be expected to be used mainly by powerful nations to induce weaker countries to implement better
standards. Even though most countries would certainly be quick to act against Fiji, there is little
perspective for action against China. Such a problem could be avoided only if it is agreed that the- 23 -
suspension of trade benefits has to be decided multilaterally at the end of an agreed dispute-
settlement process. The second problem -pointed out by many governments in developing countries-
is that the "social clause" could in principle be "hijacked" by import competing lobbies. Such groups
would make use of a "social clause" with the unique intention to raise tariffs against export-oriented
countries and destroy their comparative advantage. In the words of Bhagwati (1994, p.60): "blue
protectionism is breaking out, masked behind a moral facade". But one must be careful not to
exaggerate this danger. Intelligently implemented, a social clause could probably avoid such an
outcome. As pointed out by Freeman (1996, p.14), this protectionist argument is a little bit a "red
herring" in this debate. Finally, the third problem is that such a clause may be used against Latin
American countries themselves in case their own enforcement of standards is judged unsatisfying.
Indeed not all of the continent's nations enforce core labour rights in an entirely satisfactory way.
The case of Uruguay provides a nice illustration of the problem. Indeed, while the Uruguayan trade
minister supports the introduction of labour standards in the WTO, the OECD Secretariat (1996)
considers that it is impossible to establish independent workers' organisation in that country. If the
OECD conclusion is still true today, pressing for a social clause is really a shot in one's own foot
since Uruguay may be the first country against which the new "social clause" might be used. .
In any case, the introduction of such a clause in the WTO would require the negotiation of a
new legal framework, unanimously approved by member countries. Given the strong opposition by
many Asian countries
8 as well as by some industrialised countries
9 it is unlikely that such a clause
be adopted soon. So far the only step forward was made during the 1994 Marrakech Ministerial
meeting, where a commitment for further deliberation on this issue within the WTO was agreed on.
During the 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore, however, Ministers have affirmed their
support for core standards but have ruled out further work on this issue in the WTO. They have
also rejected the use of trade measures to enforce labour rights. But ignoring the issue will
presumably not make it go away.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has discussed the issue of Asia's "unfair" competition to Latin America, based
on the observation that fundamental labour rights are better enforced in the Latin America. This is
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obviously a very big generalisation. Some Latin American & Caribbean countries still have a long
way to go before labour rights can be considered as appropriately guaranteed. According to the
OECD (1996), it is for example impossible to establish free unions in Bolivia, Colombia,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, or Uruguay. There is no apparent reason why the denial of
the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining in those countries should not also be
considered as "unfair competition" to Latin American countries or -indeed- to Asian countries with
higher standards.
This being said, the connection between labour standards, trade, foreign investment and
employment is one of the most controversial issues in academia. And there is no doubt that much
more research is needed, especially on the South-South dimension of this issue. This is because there
is a strong likelihood that labour standards differences divert trade and foreign investment mainly
among developing countries. And if there is a danger of a "race to the bottom" it is thus probably
mainly within the South. This is somewhat ironical since -in the terms of Bhagwati (1994, p.57)- the
issue is currently "resurrecting the North-South divide that afflicted the world economy in the late
1970s". Indeed, most of the public debate and much of the research has so far focused on the role of
labour standards in trade and investment flows between industrialised countries and the developing
world. This reflects the presumption that the North is the main victim of the South's low labour
standards. But this is almost surely wrong. The countries that suffer the most from the weak
enforcement of core labour rights in China or Indonesia are almost certainly other developing
countries with higher standards. These are the countries which should find it in their interest to
support some form of international harmonisation of labour standards.
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Among others: Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Germany and Spain- 25 -
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